Currently browsing posts filed under "Investment Report"

Follow this category via RSS

2016 Investment Report V

Let’s spend five days reviewing the latest annual report (pdf) from the Investment Office. Greatest hits commentary on related topics include here, here, here and here. Today is Day 5.

I have praised the Investment Office (and Collette Chilton) for their successes and criticized them for their pay and for the lack of transparency over performance and process. What is left to say? My (forlorn?) hope is that, over the next few years, the College can improve on the dimensions that it ought to improve on. We can be as transparent about our managers as Grinnell and about our benchmark as Amherst. We would then be in a better position to discuss more substantive issues with regard to endowment management. In the meantime, here are some final thoughts:

1) New Chief Communications Officer Jim Reische was kind enough to investigate whether or not the College’s policy with regard to transparency in the calculation of the performance of the benchmark portfolio has changed. It hasn’t. Thanks to Jim for asking!

2) Unless others object, I will probably make this series an annual lecture, a topic worth revisiting each year. Although we have regular readers at EphBlog who have been with us for more than a decade (Hi Frank!), many of our readers (mainly students and their parents) are new each year, so it makes sense to revisit these important topics, updating them with any changes in College policy.

3) What other topics would readers like to see a similar deep dive into? The latest Common Data Set (pdf) is available. And we haven’t gone through recent Form 990s or the College’s financial statements in a couple of years.

4) Kudos to Managing Director Abigail Wattley ’05 for offering this excellent Winter Study class:

POEC 23 Endowment Investment Management
This class is designed to provide students with an overview of endowment and investment management and is taught by members of the Williams College Investment Office. The Investment Office is responsible for overseeing Williams’ $2.4 billion endowment. Through presentations, discussion, readings, and project work, Winter Study students will gain a better understanding of the various components of an institutional investment portfolio, how it is managed, and how investment managers are selected and monitored. Students will learn about portfolio theory as well as specific asset classes such as global equities, hedge funds, venture capital, buyouts, real estate, and fixed income. Students are expected to attend all on-campus classes (approx. 6 hours/week) and complete a set of relevant readings, a case study exercise, journal entries, and a final project. Students will also be required to complete an introductory excel course.

Does this mean that the Investment Office is no longer offering its usual Winter Study internship? I think that that would be an OK trade-off. Do we have any readers in the class? If I can get permission to share a copy of the syllabus, I will.

Facebooktwitter

2016 Investment Report IV: Pay

Let’s spend five days reviewing the latest annual report (pdf) from the Investment Office. Greatest hits commentary on related topics include here, here, here and here. Today is Day 4.

We dramatically overpay the folks who work in the Investment Office, primarily Collette Chilton but also Bradford Wakeman. The Record ought to write an article about this. Here are the questions they should ask along with my commentary.

The latest Form 990 (pdf) reports that:

bonus

Q: How many people in the Investment Office are eligible for bonuses? What is the formula used to award those bonuses? How much money, if any, in total bonuses was paid out last year? [See here for more background. The College will try to claim that releasing this information would violate the privacy rights of College employees. But note that the questions do not ask for the specific amounts given to named individuals. We just want to know how many and how much in total. Privacy concerns do not prevent Williams from releasing this data.]

Q (for Collette Chilton): If the College decided to stop paying performance bonuses, would you work less hard? Would anyone on your staff? [The College worries that Chilton and other (how many?) investment professionals won’t work hard enough even though Williams is paying them hundreds of thousands of dollars per year. So, in addition to all that guaranteed money, we need to pay them extra bonuses or else they’ll —- what exactly? Spend all day at the movies?]

I think that this is the sleaziest arrangement at Williams today and have been complaining about it for years. How did this happen? Tough to know. I am still trying to get the inside story. My guesses/speculation:

a) Both previous president Morty Schapiro and key trustees were in favor of starting an Investment Office and other steps for turning Williams into Yale.

b) No one worried too much about Chilton’s compensation. The Trustees, of course, see their role as more supervisory. They don’t set salaries. There may have been a head-hunter or compensation consultant involved. Morty, while in theory worried about the College’s overall budget, had no real incentive to pay Chilton less.

Never forget that Morty, for all his many wonderful qualities, is not — How to put this politely? — immune to the siren song of worldly wealth. It is not out of the goodness of his heart that he serves on the board of MMC. It was not an accident that he failed to take a pay-cut, unlike presidents at some other schools, during the budget crisis. It is not irrelevant to him that the Northwestern job pays around twice as much. It was not via random motion that his annual salary increased by hundreds of thousands of dollars during his time at Williams.

So, subconsciously or not, Morty would realize that a proposal to pay the new Chief Investment Officer substantially more money than he was then making would only provide a (dramatic?) upward push to his own compensation.

c) This deal was made in the bubble years. There is no way that Chilton could find a comparable job paying this much money today. Even for 2006 (when Chilton was first hired), the compensation was excessive. Professionals I quizzed felt that someone with Chilton’s resume — modest compared to others in the field — would be somewhere in the $300,000 to $500,000 range.

Consider how the actual numbers have changed from 2009 (pdf) through 2015 (pdf):

pay2009

pay2015

Collette Chilton’s pay has almost doubled in 6 years. She now makes $1.3 million dollars! Bradford Wakeman’s total compensation has gone from $360,000 to $639,000. And it is not like Wakeman is some sort of financial genius. Recall our discussion from when he was hired:

Consider a presentation by Wakeman to a risk meeting. His content seems sensible enough, but the topic (making a better 401(k) plan for Lucent) has almost nothing to do with running a major endowment.

That’s fine, perhaps Wakeman knows about other stuff as well. But I laughed out loud when reading the last slide.

Outside experts have noted, and applauded the changes Lucent made to its 401(k) plans.

Nobel laureate William Sharpe notes the changes Lucent made to its 401(k) plan: “better aligns their DB and DC plan methodologies.”

James Palermo, Vice Chairman of Mellon Financial Corporation, observed that: “Lucent is on the cutting edge of our client base with respect totreating their 401(k) plan in the same manner as their defined benefit pension plan.”

Stanford Law School Professor and co-founder of Financial Engines, Joseph Grundfest, commented that: “Lucent has made an important step in fiduciary oversight by implementing consistent management practices from plan to plan.”

Fidelity Investments recognized that: “Lucent was early in this initiative.”

Wakeman is quoting a bunch of vendors who sold things to Lucent, for whom Lucent is a customer, people who will say nice things about Lucent even if (especially if!) they think that the people in charge of the Lucent pension fund are the dumbest of the dumb.

And, as best as I can tell, Wakemen is using these quotes without a bullet point of irony. He really thinks (?!) that William Sharpe’s complimentary testimony about Lucent is meaningful information to his audience even though his audience knows that Lucent is paying thousands of dollars to Sharpe’s company: Financial Engines. My hope is that Wakeman is not this clueless, that he showed the slide but made a joke about the reliability of the testimony cited. That, anyway, is the best case scenario.

The Record should do an article about Chilton’s (and Wakeman’s and the entire investment staff’s) compensation. Don’t the editors believe in muckraking anymore? I bet that some of the more left-wing Williams professors would provide good quotes, either on or off the record.

What should be done? The College ought to close the Boston Investment Office. (Read the whole comment thread for details and background.) Most/all of the senior investment professionals (like Chilton) would decline to move to Williamstown. Problem solved, without any nasty firings or salary cuts.

In the meantime, it is hard to take seriously any of the mewlings about the problems of increased income inequality in the US — which is, sadly, a real problem — from our progressives friends on the Williams faculty if they can’t even be bothered to ask questions about the out-of-control salaries/bonuses that Williams itself pays out to some particularly undeserving members of the 1%.

Facebooktwitter

2016 Investment Report III: Transparency

Let’s spend five days reviewing the latest annual report (pdf) from the Investment Office. Greatest hits commentary on related topics include here, here, here and here. Today is Day 3.

The Investment Report provides no information about the underlying managers. As with yesterday’s example of lousy transparency when it comes to performance measurement and attribution, the College does not measure up to the best practices of its peer group.

Abigail Wattley’s ’05 addressed the topic of manager transparency in a 2015 Record op-ed:

We don’t disclose the list of our fund managers because of agreements we have entered that relate to confidentiality.

Unsophisticated readers might assume that Wattley meant, “Our managers require us to not reveal that we have invested in them, otherwise they would not want to do business with us.” That is, the managers insist on confidentiality and there is nothing the College can do.

This is absurd, at least for 95%+ of the managers the College invests with. If Williams asked them for permission to reveal their name on a list of all its managers, the vast majority of investment managers would say:

1) “Williams is the client! If Williams wants to include us on a list of managers, that is its right. Indeed, many of our investors, especially state pension funds like Texas Teachers, are required by law to reveal all their managers and even our fees!” See below (pdf) for an extract:

texas_teachers

Indeed, many (most?) of the College’s managers are publicly identified by at least some of their clients.

2) “We hope that Williams reveals our name (if not our fees and performance)! Having smart, sophisticated endowments invest with us is great advertising! The more people that know that Williams trusts us, the more money we are likely to be able to raise.”

The easiest way to see that Williams could easily make its list of managers public is to take note of other institutions that do so. (Previous discussion here.) Consider Grinnell College’s listing (pdf):

grinnell

Or how about the listing provided by The Boston Foundation (tBf):

tbf

If The Boston Foundation can provide a listing of its managers, then why can’t Williams? Note, also, that these managers are some of the most elite and sought after in the business. Some (Baupost?) are probably even closed to new investors. And yet they have no problem with tBf making their status public.

Should we expect members of the Williams Investment Office (like Wattley) and the Williams trustees to know about the practices of places like The Boston Foundation? Well, in addition to being a similar sized endowment in the same city, The Boston Foundation has a CEO (Paul Grogan ’72) and a board chair (Michael Keating ’62) who are both former trustees at Williams!

Not enough evidence? Consider the comments (via personal correspondence) of Churchill Franklin, CEO of Acadian Asset Management and former chair of the board of trustees at Middlebury.

You are right (as usual) the answer is no we [Acadian] don’t care and are happy to have the advertising. Some fund of funds and outsourced CIOs are reluctant to share the names of the managers they select, because that is their “edge” and their value-add. Huge funds are sometimes reluctant to share the names of their managers if they are trying to protect limited capacity, but the managers are almost always happy to have their names shared.

I could produce similar quotes from Ephs in money management if I thought doing so wasn’t a huge waste of their time.

Is there any way that Wattley isn’t lying? The naive among you might guess that, perhaps, for historical reasons (or because our lawyers are stupid), there are stipulations in every investment contract along the lines of: “Williams agrees to never publicly reveal the name of the investment manager.”

But, if that were so, then how could I possibly know that all of these firms (pdf and pdf) have managed money for Williams in the last few years?

hintz

spo

summit

charles bank

If the College really had “agreements … that relate to confidentiality” and which prevented the College from reporting that its managers included SPO, Summit, William Blair, Charlesbank and so on, then how do I know about these managers?

The cynic in me is afraid that Wattley is purposely trying to mislead the Williams community. She (or her boss Collete Chilton . . . or her boss’s boss) don’t want other Ephs to know who we invest in. Of course, they don’t want to lie too obviously. They just want to string together a bunch of mostly-true-individually but misleading-in-the-aggregate sentences that give everyone the impression that the College’s hands are tied.

And note how the reasoning for this secrecy has changed over time. In the 2009 Annual Report (pdf), the rational for opaqueness was:

Williams doesn’t publish a list of its outside investment managers. Because some of our most successful managers insist on confidentiality, and because the College prefers to treat managers equally, all remain confidential

Compare and contrast this (more honest!) 2009 version with what Wattley wrote in 2015:

We don’t disclose the list of our fund managers because of agreements we have entered that relate to confidentiality.

Now, we pretend that lots (all?) managers have (legal?) agreements protecting their identity. Then, we admitted that some (10? 3? 2?) of our managers insisted and that, only because we felt like it, did we decide not to publish the names of the other managers.

If the Record were a better paper, it would find out the truth. Start by asking for some example language from one of these “agreements” about the required “confidentiality,” perhaps from one of the firms that are already public.

In fact, why not start with Charlesbank! It is perfect. First, it happily allows some of its clients, like The Boston Foundation, to report its involvement. Second, Williams already reports an investment. Third, a (the?) senior member of Charlesbank is Michael Eisenson ’77, chair of the Williams Trustees, and Abigail Wattley’s boss’s boss’s boss.

Here are more questions for the Record to ask:

Q: How many outside managers does the College employ? How many managers are there within each of the endowment categories? What is the largest amount managed by a single manager? [In theory, the College should not mind answering these questions. (I think that there are 50 – 75 outside managers, but I am not sure.) I am fairly certain that what the College does is consistent with best practices. They probably have lots of managers in each category with no one manager being too large. But there is no reason not to share these statistics with the Williams community.]

Q: How much money did Williams pay to all its outside managers last year? [This would be an interesting number to know. How are members of the College community to evaluate the performance of the Investment Office without knowing how much it spends? That spending comes in two components: that spent by the Investment Office directly and that spent to pay the individual managers. (We covered the first category a few years ago.) My guess would be that this number was between $10 and $20 million, but I could easily be wrong. Different investment categories (e.g., corporate bonds versus venture capital) have radically different fee structures. The College may be able to negotiate special rates. And so on. Again, individual managers would not want the College to reveal how much they get paid, less their other investors realize that Williams is getting a better deal. But no outside manager cares if Williams reveals its total spending on managers.]

Q: How many of the outside managers have a direct connection to a Williams Trustee or to any of the members of the “Advisory Committees?” How much did the College pay these managers in aggregate? How did their performance compare to other outside managers employed by Williams? Fiduciary Responsibility 101 argues that Williams must be very careful when the people making decisions about how Williams invests its money benefit from the investments so made. I have no problem with the College making such investments. Indeed, I suspect that such investments turn out better than the average investment, if only because rich alumni would hate to be embarrassed among their rich peers for putting Williams in a sub-par investment. Still, we need to be careful.

The College already collects all this information. The (very smart and experienced!) Ephs on the Advisory Committee — people like Noriko Chen ’89 and Liz Robinson ’90 — already study this data closely, or would if/when Collette Chilton provides it to them.

There is simply no reason why Williams could not share the same information with its alumni/faculty/students. Again, such transparency is uncommon but not unusual, especially for state schools subject to open records laws. Here are details (pdf and pdf) for the University of Texas. Needless to say, there are a lot of details to consider in what to release, how often to release it and so on.

Why doesn’t Williams release this information? Not because anyone is evil, but because bureaucracies (and bureaucrats) are naturally secretive. The more that Collette Chilton and her team know — relative to what you know — the less likely you are to make trouble for them.

Facebooktwitter

2016 Investment Report II: Performance

Let’s spend five days reviewing the latest annual report (pdf) from the Investment Office. Greatest hits commentary on related topics include here, here, here and here. Today is Day 2.

The College (and Investment Office) provide little of the necessary information that we would need to evaluate their performance when it comes to the management of the endowment. The Record ought to write an article about this. Start by asking the Administration this question:

Q: The endowment dropped 1.5% last year. It is impossible to understand performance without reference to a benchmark. What does the College use as a benchmark and who calculates its performance? Can you provide us with the details behind this calculation?

The Investment Report refers to an “internal benchmark” and to a “Policy Portfolio Benchmark” (presumably the same thing) but has declined, in the past, to provide any details. That is ridiculous. There is no way for anyone to know if Chilton and her staff are doing a good job if there is not some (public) benchmark to compare their results with. Every mutual fund in the US is required by the SEC to provide performance relative to a well-defined benchmark. Consider this chart from the Annual Report:

perf

This chart is designed to make us cheer: Yeah Williams! Hooray for Collette Chilton! We/she beat the “Policy Portfolio Benchmark” over the last 1, 3, 5 and 10 year horizons. Pay Collette and her team more money! They are geniuses!

But Williams does not provide the necessary details for us to calculate those benchmark returns ourselves. Consider how a peer school does it:

Amherst’s strategic policy benchmark is a weighted average return derived by applying the target strategic portfolio weights of each asset class to the performance of the respective asset class benchmark.

Just so. And because Amherst is a serious and honest organization (!), it provides all the necessary details, e.g.,

amherstperf

Investment professionals might quibble with some of the choices here. But there is no excuse for Williams not to provide the same sorts of data. Instead, we get prose like this:

attr

We need the exact benchmark that William is using to measure the performance of, for example, its global long equity managers. MSCI World, MSCI ACWI, even MSCI EAFE plus the S&P 500, would all be reasonable choices. Nor is Amherst an outlier when it compares to transparency in reporting benchmark performance. Consider Yale:

yale

Again, we can quibble. Is the Wilshire 5,000 really a good benchmark for domestic equities? But that is precisely the discussion we should be having. Williams has no good excuse for not being at least as transparent as peer colleges like Amherst and Yale when it comes to providing the details behind endowment performance calculations.

To be fair to Williams, not every school is as transparent as Amherst and Yale. Dartmouth, for example, does not provide the details (pdf) behind the returns of its Policy Benchmark portfolio. Perhaps our friends at Dartblog have some thoughts?

Facebooktwitter

2016 Investment Report I

Let’s spend five days reviewing the latest annual report (pdf) from the Investment Office. Greatest hits commentary on related topics include here, here, here and here. Today is Day 1.

Let’s begin with the good news. First, the Williams Investment Office, led by CIO Collette Chilton, has done a solid job over the last decade, as EphBlog predicted in 2007.

How competent is Chilton herself? Informed commentary welcome! I have spoken with people who have run money for her and the consensus opinion is that she is a solid professional. She has experience selecting and monitoring investment managers

More importantly, she avoided the temptation of the Harvard model and has not tried to manage any of the money directly. Returns have been solid:

endowment

As long as the College’s endowment is somewhere in the middle of the pack when it comes to trailing 10 year returns, alumni should not complain about performance. (We will have many other things to complain about over the next four days.)

Second, the future of the endowment seems assured in that Managing Director Abigail Wattley ’05 will make a wonderful successor to Chilton someday (hopefully) soon. Recall my advice from 10 years ago:

The biggest risk issue in any asset management situation is the option value to the asset manager. Will Chilton take on the appropriate amount of risk, consist with her guidance from Morty and the trustees? I hope so. But doing so might not be in her best financial interest. Imagine, instead, that she “shoots for the moon,” that she levers up the endowment and invests in the riskiest stuff available. If she is lucky, she (and the College) will win big. Then the fawning profiles from the New York Times will roll in and she will have the option of starting her own hedge fund and (trying to) generate serious personal wealth. Heads, she wins.

And, if it’s tails — if those risky bets don’t pay off, if our endowment performs poorly — Williams loses. Chilton, probably, keeps her job. She blames factors beyond her control. And, it will be hard for anyone to know what really happened.

Yale, smartly, hedges this risk by hiring someone like David Swensen, someone whose commitment to the success of the institution is beyond question. Williams could have followed suit, could have selected an Eph Swensen, a younger graduate with finance experience and a deep connection to the College, someone already living in the Williamstown area or eager to move there. Someone committed to Williams for life, and not just until a better job comes along, until the commute to Williamstown becomes too annoying. Such candidates were available. Instead, the College chose Chilton. I hope it works out.

It has worked out. I may have overplayed the risk of Chilton pulling a Meyer. And, certainly, given Meyer’s implosion at Convexity among other changes, there are many fewer opportunities for successful endowment CIOs outside of the CIO market. But there is no doubt that Chilton has done a wonderful job of selecting and then mentoring Wattley, someone who is universally praised by the Investment Committee Ephs I have talked to. Wattley is married to Kevin Kingman ’05 and is as committed to the long term success of Williams as anyone. With luck, she will be managing the endowment for decades to come.

Third, although I would still prefer that the Investment Office were located in Williamstown, Chilton (and Wattley?) have done a great job in involving students and recent graduates in the office via (at least) three mechanisms.

  1. Full-Time Investment Analyst Program: A two-year position open to graduating seniors
  2. Summer Analyst Program: Summer positions open to rising juniors and seniors
  3. Winter Study Program: A winter study class open to sophomores and juniors

I have spoken to Ephs in all three programs, all of which are well-done. (One suggested improvement is that Chilton/Wattley ought to encourage younger Ephs to network more in the Boston financial community.) If Williams (like Middlebury or Smith) were to outsource the management of its endowment to a place like Investure, these programs would not be possible.

See! EphBlog can praise the praiseworthy! Relative to its peers, the Williams Investment Office in general and Collette Chilton specifically is just as competent and professional as, for example, the Wiliams English Department or Career Center. Kudos to Chilton and to the Trustees who selected her. Stand by for four days of (constructive!) criticism starting tomorrow.

Facebooktwitter

Investment Report

The 2015 Annual Report from the Investment Office (pdf) is available. Comments:

1) Should I spend a week dissecting this? Let me know in the comments.

2) If you are the Record reporter assigned to cover this, please be professional by contacting at least one critic of the Investment Office. The last few Record overviews on this topic have been less hard-hitting than the typical high school newspaper.

3) Background readings: one, two and three.

4) I am probably the Investment Office’s least popular Eph, going back to this (brilliant?) blog post 8 years ago.

5) Collette Chilton (not satisfied with her current $1.3+ million pay check) is looking for a raise! How else to explain this new (I think) line from the report:

In dollar terms, our added value for fiscal year 2015 was over $100 million.

Really? I have my doubts. And it would be pathetic for the Record to fail to determine exactly where this claim comes from.

Facebooktwitter

Global Long/Short

From a professional perspective, the most important aspect of the 2009 Investment Report (pdf) is the move to reduce long-only equity exposure. This decision matters more to the wealth of Williams over the next 50 years than anything else that the college has done in the last decade. Will the Record be smart enough to cover it? Probably not. And that is why you have EphBlog! Consider the key asset allocation table:

asset_allocation_09

The College is making some fairly radical changes. Is anyone on the faculty paying attention? Or do they just assume that financial industry hot-shots always know what is best? Just asking!

The less important change here is the move from looking at equities on a domestic-versus-international basis to grouping all public equities into a single Global Equity class. See this report from MSCI/Barra (pdf) for an overview of the issues involved. I agree with this switch.

The much more important change is the dramatic decrease in long-only equity exposure. This is huge. Recall our previous discussion of the College’s asset allocation. Here are the numbers for June 30, 2006 and June 30, 2007. (Collette Chilton began work in the fall of 2006.)

asset_allocation_06_07

Click on the images for better views. Can you spot the inconsistency? Details and discussion below.
Read more

Facebooktwitter

Questions on the 2009 Investment Report III

Here is one last question that the Record should ask about the 2009 Investment Report. (Previous questions and background here and here.)

Q: The Boston Foundation, run by former Williams trustee Paul Grogan ’72, and Grinnell College provide information on the outside managers they employ. Why doesn’t Williams?
Read more

Facebooktwitter

Questions on the 2009 Investment Report II

Here are more questions that the Record should ask about the 2009 Investment Report. (For background, read this.)

A recurrent theme is that the Report is completely correct when it emphasizes the importance of, among other things, transparency and fees in its dealings with outside managers.

By continually monitoring outside managers, the Investment Office extends its initial due diligence into a formal regime designed to verify that each investment management firm is meeting its investment objectives, the overall objectives of the portfolio with respect to transparency, liquidity and concentration, and other requirements.

Just so. But then the we should hold Williams to the same standards. If the College is going to demand transparency from outside managers than we — alumni, students, and faculty — should demand a similar amount of transparency from Williams. In particular, Williams should meet the highest standards of endowment transparency.

Q: How many outside managers does the College employ? How many managers are there within each of the endowment categories? What is the largest amount managed by a single manager? [In theory, the College should not mind answering these questions. (I think that there are 50 – 75 outside managers, but I am not sure.) I am fairly certain that what the College does is consistent with best practices. They probably have lots of managers in each category with no one manager being too large. But there is no reason not to share these statistics with the Williams community.]

More questions below.
Read more

Facebooktwitter

Questions on the 2009 Investment Report

The Williams College Investment Report 2009 is available. I believe that this is the first year that the College has issued a separate report. Normally, the only investment related information that is made public comes in the annual A Report From Williams. This version is much more detailed. Kudos to Williams for preparing this report and for making it public.

Normally, I would wait for the Record to write an article about the endowment’s performance and then criticize it. But let’s be more pro-active and constructive! Here are the questions that the Record reporters should ask Chief Investment Officer Collete Chilton and/or Investment Committee Chair Michael Eisenson ’77. (For expert commentary from the faculty, the Record should also reach out to professors with finance knowledge/experience: Caprio, Gentry, Kuttner, Rai and Savaser, among others.)

I will put the proposed questions in bold and then associated background/commentary in [italics].

Q: The endowment dropped 18.4% last year. It is impossible to understand performance without reference to a benchmark. What does the College use as a benchmark for the endowment and how was the benchmark’s performance? [So far, Williams has refused to release any information with regard to the benchmark that it uses for the endowment. That is ridiculous. There is no way for anyone to know if Chilton and her staff are doing a good job if there is not some benchmark to compare their results with. Every mutual fund in the US is required by the SEC to provide performance relative to a benchmark.]

Q: The College’s letter to the Senate Finance Committee reported that:

Some members of the Investment Office are eligible for bonuses based on the return on our investments, though the office is so new that we have not completed the first year of returns on which bonuses would be computed. So, in the past ten years no such bonuses have been paid.

How many people in the Investment Office are eligible for bonuses? What is the formula used to award those bonuses? How much money, if any, in total bonuses was paid out last year? [See here for more background. The College will try to claim that releasing this information would violate the privacy rights of College employees. But note that the questions do not ask for the specific amounts given to named individuals. We just want to know how many and how much in total. Privacy concerns do not prevent Williams from releasing this data.]

See below for more questions.
Read more

Facebooktwitter

Currently browsing posts filed under "Investment Report"

Follow this category via RSS